revived repertoires. They may also strike responsive chords among people who previously thought they were free from such adversarial sentiments.
In what follows I wish to explore this new resonance. It is partly a personal account, an attempt at introspection, tracing emotional and affective shifts in the way I perceive and experience America. Let me begin with a necessary proviso. Recently, in a piece in the French newspaper Le Monde, 3 Alfred Grosser reminded us that one need not be antiAmerican for opposing America's foreign policy, nor an anti-Semite or anti-Zionist for taking Israeli government policy to task. He is not the first to make the point, nor will he be the last. The point bears making time and time again. Too often the cry of antiAmericanism or anti-Semitism is used as a cheap debating trick to silence voices of unwelcome criticism. Like Grosser I have studied forms of anti-Americanism for years,
trying to understand what triggers it, trying to understand the logic of its inner structure, while looking at it from a rather Olympian height. More often than not the subject had seemed more meaningfully connected to the non-American settings where it appeared than to America itself. But like Grosser I now feel the need to make a point that had for so long seemed obvious. He and I and many others now feel a stronger urge to take our distance from the directions that American foreign policy is taking, and ironically are now confronting the charge that we have become anti-American. A topic of intellectual and scholarly interest has now assumed the poignancy of a private dilemma. Grosser and I and others know we have not turned anti-American, while having become critical of the turn American policies have taken. We are now facing the question of when a stance critical of specific American policies becomes anti-American. For that shift to occur, more is needed than disagreement, however vehement. Anti-Americanism typically proceeds from specific areas of disagreement to larger frameworks of rejection, seeing particular policies or particular events as typical of a more general image of America. Anti-Americanism in that sense is mostly reductionist, seeing only the simplicity of the cowboy and Texas provincialism in President George W. Bush's response to terrorism, or the expansionist thrust of American capitalism in Bush's Middle-East policies. And so on, and so forth. Entire repertoires of stereotyped Americas can be conjured up to account for any contemporary trans-Atlantic disagreements.
To the extent that for people like Grosser and me the topic of anti-Americanism has come home to roost, the following section illustrates the before-and-after quality of my involvement with the topic. It is in part a personal account of my attempts to keep my feelings of alienation and anger over recent trends in America's foreign policy from alienating me from America more generally. It is the report of a balancing act. Americans powerfully re-appropriated a place where a year ago international terrorism was in charge. They literally turned the site into a lieu de mémoire. They were in the words of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, read again on this occasion, consecrating the place. They imbued it with the sense and meaning of a typically American scripture. It is the language that, for over two centuries, has defined America's purpose and mission in the ringing words of freedom and democracy.
I borrow the words "American scripture" from Michael Ignatieff. He used them in a piece he wrote for a special issue of Granta. 4 He is one of twenty-four writers from various parts of the world who contributed to a section entitled "What We Think of America." Ignatieff describes American scripture as "the treasure house of language, at once sacred and profane, to renew the faith of the only country on earth (...) whose citizenship is an act of faith, the only country whose promises to itself continue to command the faith of people like me, who are not its citizens." Ignatieff is a Canadian.
He describes a faith and an affinity with American hopes and dreams that many nonAmericans share. Yet, if it was the point of Granta's editors to explore the question of "Why others hate us, Americans," Ignatieff's view is not of much help. In the outside world after 9/11, as Granta's editor, Ian Jack, reminds us, there was a wide-spread feeling that "Americans had it coming to them", that it was "good that At the end of the day, they will kick us out of the United Nations, try those responsible in the international court in The Hague, and no one will want to speak to us. The current Bush administration, with its pre-emptive strategy of taking out opponents before they can harm the US at home or abroad, in much the same way that We are all Americans, but sometimes it is hard to see the Americans we hold dear in the Americans that hold sway. Those are the dangerous moments when clashing policy views may assume the contours of deeper, more fundamental differences-when difference translates into incompatibility, and the face of just one president may seem to reflect an America that has changed its face more permanently and fundamentally.
What different kind of face could that be? As some see it, it may have begun to
show the effects of long-term cultural trends that increasingly set America apart from voices discard as the "Old Europe" those countries that criticize the drift of American foreign policy, while hailing other countries as the "New Europe" that are willing to follow in America's footsteps. Robert Kagan contributed to this rising anti-Europeanism in the United States when he paraphrased the dictum that men are from Mars, women from Venus. As he chose to present the two poles, Americans now are the new Martians, while Europeans are the new Venutians. Never mind the gendering implied in his view that Europeans are collectively engaged in a feminine endeavor when they pursue the new, transnational and cosmopolitan Europe. He does make an astute point, though, when he describes the European quest as Kantian, as an endeavor to create a transnational space where laws and civility rule. As Kagan sees it, though, the Europeans are so self-immersed that they are forgetful of a larger world that is Hobbesian, not Kantian, and is a threat to them as much as to the United States. To the extent that Europeans still involve themselves in the larger world they tend to emphasize peace-keeping operations rather than pre-emptive military strikes. 
